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ATTENTIONAL TUNNELING AND TASK MANAGEMENT
Christopher D. Wickens
University of Illinois, Aviation Human Factors Division
Savoy, Illinois
This paper discusses attentional tunneling as one cause of breakdowns in task management. The phenomenon is
defined, and empirical evidence is then reviewed to show the conditions in which the phenomenon is created by
head up display location, compelling 3D displays, fault management, and automation induced complacency.
Statistical and methodological issues are reviewed regarding the generalization of the phenomenon in the laboratory
to real world mishaps.
Introduction
Breakdowns in task management and task
prioritization have been well documented to cause
mishaps in aviation (Funk, 1991; Chou, Madhavan,
& Funk, 1996). A classic accident here is the crash of
the Eastern Airlines L1011 into the Everglades, when
pilots failed to manage their descending altitude
while addressing an apparent landing gear failure.
While such breakdowns have diverse psychological
causes (Dismukes, 2001), our specific interest in this
paper is focused on a collection of related phenomena
that are known variously by names of “attentional
tunneling”, “attentional fixation” or “cognitive
tunneling”. Note that in this context, “attention” and
“cognition” can be used nearly interchangeably, if it
is assume that attention can be directed both inward
to cognition, as well as outward toward particular
channels and events in the environment.
We can offer a rough definition of attentional
tunneling as the allocation of attention to a particular
channel of information, diagnostic hypothesis or task
goal, for a duration that is longer than optimal, given
the expected cost of neglecting events on other
channels, failing to consider other hypotheses, or
failing to perform other tasks. Thus note that the
definition must include both the forces that “lock the
tunnel” to its current channel, as well as a definition
of a channel of neglect.
Such a definition can account for more specific
mishaps in a wide variety of circumstances. For
example automobile accidents while on the cell
phone can be attributed to undesirable “engagement”
in the process of generating and understanding
conversations (Strayer & Johnston, 2001; Horrey &
Wickens, in press). Analysis of the Three Mile Island
nuclear power accident associated the crisis with
operators’ excessive tunneling on one (incorrect)
hypothesis as to the nature of the obvious failure, and
this hypothesis led them to fail to attend to
contraindicating visual cues. The Air Force has
identified attentional tunneling as being a major

cause of F16 mishaps, and indeed a case can be made
that nearly all CFIT accidents (Shappell & Wickens,
2003) can be associated with attentional tunneling
away from important altitude information.
While salient mishap data clearly indicates that the
tunneling problem exists, such data often provide
little usable evidence about its precise causes,
because of the invariable absence of control that such
data contain when they are used retrospectively to
infer causality. Thus a complementary approach is to
turn to more controlled flight simulation
experimental data to both reveal the prevalence of the
phenomenon in the general population, as well as the
causal factors that amplify the likelihood of
tunneling. Below we describe empirical data that bear
on proposed causes of attentional tunneling to
examine how the literature supports the degree of
influence of each. We focus explicitly on four
different factors that have been postulated to induce
such tunneling: head up display location, the
compellingness of 3D displays, fault management,
and automation. We conclude with discussion of
some of the methological and statistical issues
involved in relating tunneling to flight safety.
Display location: HUD-induced tunneling. The now
classic experiment of Fischer, Haines and Price
(1980) revealed that pilots flying with a HUD were
less likely to detect an unexpected runway incursion
than those flying with conventional head down
instruments, despite the fact that the HUD generally
preserved the runway within foveal vision, where the
incursion could be seen. While their observation of
this phenomenon was not based upon a sufficiently
large sample of pilots to reveal statistical trends, the
phenomenon has been sufficiently replicated in both
low fidelity (Wickens & Long, 1995) and high
fidelity (Fadden, Ververs & Wickens, 2001; Hofer,
Braune, Boucek, & Pfaff, 2000) simulations to
establish it as real. Something about the HUD
appears to attract attention to its image, and therefore
lead attention away from important, but unexpected
events within the visual field (see Wickens, Ververs
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& Fadden, 2004 for a summary). Such HUD costs
appear to be restricted to noticing totally unexpected
events, since HUD benefits are generally found for
most other visual tasks, including the detection of
low frequency (but not truly surprising) events
(Fadden et al., 2001).
3D Immersion Compellingness. The gradual
appearance of 3D displays in the cockpit, such as the
SVS guidance system (Prinzel et al., 2004; Schnell et
al., 2004), has led to some concern that the highly
realistic ego-referenced perspective of such a system
can alter pilots’ scan patterns so that they look
extensively at the display (attentional tunneling), and
fail to adequately sample the outside world. Such
behavior can compromise safety to the extent that
critical events, unknown to the data-generation
sensors and software that drive the display, may be
present as hazards in the outside world (e.g., the
“rogue airplane” with an inoperable transponder;
Wickens et al., 2002). Earlier research by Olmos
Wickens and Chudy (2000) revealed such a trend
exhibited in a 3D display in fighter aircraft in a low
fidelity simulation. Four recent experiments in our
laboratory described below, all using a high fidelity
light aircraft Frasca simulator, clearly document the
phenomenon.
Fadden, Ververs and Wickens (2001), compared a 3D
“pathway-in-the-sky” display in a HUD location with
a conventional HUD presenting ILS information in
an approach and landing simulation. While we
observed superior overall performance with the 3D
display we did observe that the pathway induced a
marginally significant 4 second delay in pilots’
response to an unexpected runway incursion on a
single (last) landing trial of the experiment.
Wickens, Alexander, Horrey, Nunes, and Hardy (2004;
Thomas & Wickens, 2004), examined the guidance
offered by a photo-realistic SVS display coupled with
a 3D flight path pathway display in a long curved step
down approach through a terrain challenged
environment. Guidance and traffic detection
performance with the 3D pathway was compared with
that supported by less compelling (but equally
accurate) instruments presenting the same flight path
information. While flight path performance was much
better supported by the integrated pathway, the
detection of two unexpected or “off-normal” events
was not. These included a blimp, located in the
airspace on the flight path, but not visible in any head
down display, and a runway offset, whereby the
positioning of the SVS pathway and the synthetic
runway on the display brought the pilots on an

approach parallel to but offsetting the true runway (a
disparity only detectable by looking outside).
We observed that 4 of the 8 pilots flying with the
pathway failed to detect the blimp, whereas only 1 of
6 pilots flying without the pathway missed this
critical off-normal event. Furthermore, while the
runway offset was only imposed on those landing
with the 3D pathway (and hence data could not be
compared with those flying with the conventional
instruments), 5 of the 12 pilots landing with the 3D
pathway failed to detect the offset until very late in
the landing phase. Furthermore, analysis of visual
scanning revealed that the breakdowns in detection
were associated with pilots who spent relatively more
time looking head down at the instruments, rather
than scanning outside. To some extent this head
down scanning was “encouraged” by the rich and
precise guidance offered by the pathway, and by the
runway depiction on the head down terrain display
lying on the SVS panel.
In a third study, Alexander, Wickens and Hardy (in
press) also examined SVS-induced tunneling,
although they did not compare their off-normal event
detection with a control non SVS condition. On the
final approach in their simulation, during the final
trial of the experiment, a truly surprising runway
incursion was present. This incursion did not itself
form the basis of the unexpected event, since the
tunnel guidance was designed to automatically
reconfigure to form a missed approach path, and
guide the pilot away from the runway obstacle.
However the missed approach path was designed to
put the flight trajectory squarely in the path of a
blimp, visible only in the outside world, as in the first
off-normal event examined by Wickens, Alexander,
Horrey, Nunes, and Hardy (2004). Importantly, 17 of
the 24 pilots in the experiment failed to detect the
blimp, flying a flight path directly through it.
While the above findings suggest that the 3D
pathway (and its associated SVS background) can
inhibit the detection of truly surprising events, it is
important to highlight two findings that failed to
indicate “pathway induced tunneling”. First,
Wickens, Alexander, Horrey, Nunes, and Hardy
(2004) examined a third off-normal event, a radio
tower constructed so that it protruded into the
pathway-defined flight path, but was visible on the
SVS display. Here all pilots appeared to detect the
tower adequately, as inferred from their flight path
maneuvering.
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The second example of “3D pathway success” was an
experiment by Iani and Wickens (2004), using the
same flight simulation as above, in which pilots’
response to unexpected weather changes on a head
down electronic weather map designed to influence
the choice of an optimal safe flight path, were used to
infer tunneling. Under these circumstances, those
pilots flying with the 3D pathway display, which we
hypothesized might induce tunneling, were actually
more likely to notice the weather changes, than those
flying with the separated instruments. This result, in
seeming contradiction to the 3D pathway costs
described above, were accounted for by two factors:
(1) the weather changes, while unexpected, were not
truly surprising, in that a well trained pilot, flying
through areas where bad weather may exist, can be
expected to be reasonably vigilant for unexpected
changes in those weather patterns; (2) the 3D
pathway was so much easier to fly (lower workload)
than the separated display, that pilots were inferred to
have a much greater amount of available attention
with which to monitor the surrounding displays.
In summarizing these effects of immersed 3D display
compellingness, we argue that some components of
both a 3D SVS terrain background and a 3D pathway
(or tunnel) hosted within, may contribute to a large
allocation of visual attention to this location, an
allocation which can leave a pilot vulnerable to
missing truly surprising events that can only be seen
elsewhere. Not all pilots demonstrate this, but those
that do, tend to scan outside less than those that don’t.
Importantly, one variable that appears to amplify this
tunneling effect is the existence of a system failure. It is,
for example, a failure of the overall SVS system that
leads its guidance to a runway offset approach. Also, the
one circumstance where the tunneling was most
dramatically documented (over 70% of the pilots) was
the finding of the blimp collision by Alexander et al. (in
press), in what could be classified as a “double failure”.
That is, there was a runway incursion (failure of the air
traffic management system), coupled with a failure of
the SVS sensors to note the mid-air blimp following the
missed approach path configuration. Thus we now
discuss the contributions of failure management to
attentional tunneling.
Failure Management. We noted above that
attentional tunneling was amplified during the missed
approach incident coupled with the sensor failure.
Indeed there is a long history of research
documenting the problems of failure and fault
management inducing some sort of cognitive lockout,
as true with the Eastern Airlines Everglades crash,
and as demonstrated in other domains such as process

control (Moray & Rotenberg, 1989). Dismukes
(2001) has highlighted fault management as one of
the “red flags” that pilots need to consider, as they
remember to sample other non-fault-related
instruments in the cockpit. The extent to which this
results from the stress-induced cognitive narrowing
brought on by the danger of the failure state (Hockey,
1986), or simply the high importance of the fault
management task (which should optimally command
a good deal of attention, even if not all of it) cannot
be fully discriminated. Probably some of both factors
are involved.
Automation Failure and Complacency. A final
phenomenon, with great relevance to the cockpit, is
that of automation induced “complacency” whereby a
pilot, depending on automation which has always
functioned safely in the past, fails to notice the
unexpected failure (Parasuraman, Molloy & Singh,
1993; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). This
phenomenon is closely related to the “automation
bias” reported by Mosier et al. (1998) whereby
automation-based diagnosis is blindly followed by
the pilot, in spite of evidence to the contrary. In a
sense this phenomenon does not describe the capture
of and “lock on” of attention (by the salient or
compelling entity), so much as it describes the
neglect of attention (to the channel characterizing the
automated processing where events – failures -- are
not expected to occur). Importantly, this phenomenon
shares with other examples of tunneling described
above, the property that its manifestations occur most
notably when automation failures are extremely
unexpected (e.g., truly surprising). These are what we
describe as the “first failure effects” (Wickens, 2000,
Yeh et al., 2003). Subsequent failures of automation
now known by the supervisor to be imperfect appear
to lead to less dramatic forms of attentional neglect of
the automated process.
Statistical and Methodological Issues. The
investigation of attentional tunneling is challenged by
certain statistical issues. Most importantly, because it
is an effect generally manifest with unexpected/
surprising events, it is a phenomenon that by
definition can be effectively produced only one or
two times per experiment (or per flight simulation). If
the event used to document attentional tunneling
occurs more frequently than this, it will by definition,
no longer be surprising. One consequence of this fact
is that pilot response to the event will be subject to
high variability (since variability decreases with
sample size, and the sample size will be small); as a
consequence, the effects will be of relatively low
statistical power, and researchers should be willing to
accept a greater likelihood of committing a type 2
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statistical error by raising their alpha level for
significance above the 0.05 level (Wickens, 1996,
2001) when examining such responses to rare events.
(We note here the advantages of measuring visual
scanning (Thomas & Wickens, 2004), a technique
with relatively high statistical power, since it can be
continuously measured, that can be a direct measure
of attentional tunneling; thus a channel that is not
looked at for a long period of time, can be inferred to
produce neglect of important events that occur along
that channel, should those events ever occur).
A methodological criticism that is sometimes
directed toward the research typical of that above,
which has documented attentional tunneling in flight
simulation experiments, is that this is somewhat of an
artificial phenomenon of the simulation laboratory,
and that pilots flying in the “real world” would be
more vigilant of such unexpected events, because of
the higher stakes involved, and/or because of a
greater expectancy that “anything can happen”. On
the one hand, there is some merit to this concern over
generalizability. For example Fadden, Ververs and
Wickens (2001) found that HUD-induced attentional
tunneling was manifest for those pilots who had not
participated in a flight simulation involving the offnormal runway incursion, but that the phenomenon
was not shown by those who had previous
experience. Thus it is possible that experience may
mitigate the tunneling effect.
In response, however, two counterarguments can be
given. First, the phenomenon has been demonstrated
in very high fidelity simulations, by well qualified
commercial pilots (Hofer et al., 2000). Second,
higher levels of training may, ironically, make pilots
less, rather than more likely to “expect the
unexpected”, if the unexpected event has never
occurred within their many years of flight. A driving
analogy is appropriate here. Most people drive on an
expressway with a headway that is well less than the
minimum to avoid a rear end collision should the
leading driver suddenly come to a halt. This tendency
is, in part, the result of never having experienced
such an event.
Going beyond the issue of statistical and
methodological issues, a strong case can be made that
the safety implications of attentional tunneling may
simply not be amenable to conventional statistical
techniques that focus on ”the statistics of the mean”.
This is because accidents, the target of generalization
from our research, are not typical, and are probably
not caused by human error of the “average” pilot
flying in typical circumstances (Wickens, 2000,

2001). Rather, we might expect them to be caused by
the poorly trained pilot, in high workload
environments, perhaps, as noted above, dealing with
a failure management scenario. Thus while only a
small number of pilots may demonstrate the
phenomenon of interest in the simulation laboratory,
so also only a small number of pilots may
demonstrate unsafe neglect and attentional tunneling
in the sky in such a way as to lead to a mishap. Given
that such accidents are well documented, any
identification of factors that may invite greater
tunneling, are worthy of empirical investigation. We
hope that the factors discussed above contribute to
that investigation.
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